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Abstract The question of nihilism in Japan is treated from a cultural and philosophical view-
point, aiming to provide some hints for a critical discussion. Through the perspectives of Foucault 
and Bourdieu, different cultural phenomena in modern Japan could be defined as ‘technologies 
of the self’ and ‘habitus’: the practice of writing among some novelists; the practice of philosophy 
and (self-) awareness among thinkers influenced by Buddhism; as well as, in a completely differ-
ent field, the practice of performing arts (dance, theatre, music), or martial arts (budo�). The focus 
is on recognising two commonly spread hermeneutic tendencies: 1. Nihilism in Japan has been 
more often the problem of the individual than the problem of truth. 2. The debate on the individual 
and nihilism in Japan has not been dealt with in exclusively intellectual terms. Rather it has imme-
diately referred to practical levels in which the dialectics between technologies of political control 
and technologies of the self have played a fundamental role.
Summary 1. Nihilism, Subjectivity and Practices in modern Japan. – 2. Applying the Concept of 
Nihilism to Japan. – 3. Nihilism and Practices of Writing in Japanese Modern Literature. – 4. Nihil-
ism and the Individual in the Kyoto School. – 5. Nishitani and Nihilism.
1 Nihilism, Subjectivity and Practices in Modern Japan
The aim of this paper is to provide some hints for a critical discussion of the 
question of nihilism in Japan from a cultural and philosophical perspective. 
A debate on this theme requires an integrated interpretation of certain 
aspects that are often considered apart and that range from literature to 
political thought, from the history of education to philosophy. At the same 
time, it also requires avoidance of undue applications of certain Western 
hermeneutic categories to East Asian history. It is certainly easy to lapse 
into cultural particularism. Nevertheless, this risk should not prevent us 
from attempting to follow a third way between the adoption of universal-
ist and potentially colonialist concepts, and the resigned acceptance of 
cultural fragmentation. This ‘third way’ may consist of starting to pay 
«close attention to the questions [Japanese philosophers] are trying to 
answer», since «it is easy to make the error of asking our questions of a 
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philosopher from another tradition or time» (Kasulis 2009, pp. 216-217). 
Discussing nihilism in Japan, then, implies paying attention to the ques-
tion of modernity in general (how to define modernity?), while at the same 
time asking whether there can be any variation in this historiographical 
scheme (is multiple modernity a possible concept? Or is modernity just 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ case?), with regards to the allegedly specific Japanese 
modernity (is there a peculiar Japanese way to Modernity?). In this es-
say, this perspective is sought via Foucault’s conception of ‘technologies 
of the self ’, mainly in their dialectical relation with the ‘technologies of 
control’,1 which refers to the problem of technology. This approach may 
provide viable alternatives to the straight juxtaposition between modern/
non-modern, all too often improperly conflated with the Western/non-
Western pairing. The question of technology in Japan may prove to be of 
paramount importance in reallocating the general discourse on Japanese 
intellectual history in Japan for the reasons that will later become clear. 
According to Foucault, the technologies of the self «permit individuals to 
effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality» (Foucault 1988, p. 
18). These technologies of the self can function as the last line of cultural, 
political or social self-defence, and make the individual more resistant 
to the technologies of control whose goal is that of homogenising social, 
political or cultural space. Their role can be that of variously balancing 
external pressure with internal urges, mitigating the conforming strength 
of social and political practices, and making the individual more conscious 
of him/herself, or negotiating the meaning of individuality in a country like 
Japan which, due to its cultural history, had to find its own path in these 
matters.
Since Foucault was mainly dealing with classical Western culture, his 
position on this theme should be adjusted in the light of the ways in which 
Buddhist and Daoist practices handle ‘control’ over oneself: a simple ex-
tension of control over the aspects that the Ego does not command could 
be counter-productive since this very ego represents the fundamental 
problem to be solved by those religious paths. In Buddhist terms, control 
1 The French philosopher draws a distinction between four types of technology, that is: 
technologies of production; technologies of sign systems; technologies of power and control 
over the others and, finally, technologies of the self, which have close links with each other. 
The importance of this theme in Foucault’s thought is admitted by Foucault himself, who 
began his work as a research project on normalising training in the modern state (e.g. the 
institutions of mental hospitals and prisons) and turned in his last years to the individualis-
ing practices in classical culture (see Foucault 1988, 2001). 
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cannot be considered as ultimate, but only as part of conventional truth.2 
For these reasons, Foucault’s position should fruitfully work together with 
Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, namely:
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in 
order to attain them (Bourdieu 1980, p. 53).
In other words, from the perspective of intellectual history, the technolo-
gies of the self in modern Japan may be considered to have as their goal 
the attainment of certain habitus that work as individuating factors, even 
beyond the control of the subject.
Seen from a Foucaultian perspective, different cultural phenomena in 
modern Japan could be defined as technologies of the self: the practice of 
writing among some writers; the practice of philosophy and (self-) aware-
ness among thinkers influenced by Buddhism; as well as, in a completely 
different field, the practice of performing arts (dance, theatre, music), or 
martial arts (budō) as elaborated by modern masters, who often changed 
the original aims of the fighting methods inherited from the past and dis-
covered new possibilities in education or self-cultivation.3
Why mention habitus and technologies of the self in a discussion about 
nihilism? Although in this paper the limited space does not allow for much 
more than a general outline of the problem, the focus of this essay is on two 
main theses, the intention of which is not to demonstrate that all Japanese 
intellectuals have shared the same ideas on this question, but to recognise 
some diffused hermeneutic tendencies: 1. Nihilism in Japan has often been 
associated with the practical questions of citizenship/subjectivity/human 
being, and of how to configure the individual in relation to the state/so-
ciety or the world. It has been intensely debated since the beginnings of 
the modernisation process, but, marking a certain contrast with Western 
intellectual history, it has been more often discussed in the context of the 
problem of the individual than the problem of truth. 2. The debate on the 
individual and nihilism in Japan has not been dealt with in exclusively 
intellectual terms. Rather it has been immediately referred to practical 
levels in which the dialectics between technologies of political control and 
2 See e.g.: «One controls the mind through conventional truth, then destroys it by the 
highest truth» (Potter 1999, p. 297). 
3 Examples of these personalities were Kanō Jigorō (1860-1938) founder of the Kōdōkan 
jūdō; Funakoshi Gichin (1868-1957), founder of Shōtōkan karate; Ueshiba Morihei (1883-
1969), founder of aikidō and very close to the new religion Ōmotokyō. 
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technologies of the self have played a fundamental role. Hence, habitus 
and practices in general were both used to reabsorb the individualistic tide 
engendered by modernisation (thus becoming technologies of control, in 
Foucault’s terms), or, conversely, also inspired by nihilism, they affirmed 
various forms of subjectivity, not necessarily convergent with Western 
ones, promoting political, social or cultural resistance, or at least mediating 
inner and outer worlds (therefore falling into the Foucaultian category of 
technologies of the self). To a certain extent, the very same technologies, 
especially those whose bodily involvement is very strong and which were 
highly codified by rituals, procedures and symbolism deriving from pre-
modern knowledge, could be used both as normalising or individualising 
technology, due to the ambiguous nature of the body itself, which is what 
makes the individual part of the world, and, at the same time, what defines 
it as different from the world.
In fact, Confucian and Buddhist awareness that the educational and bod-
ily factors play an important role in culture and society did not decrease 
in Meiji Japan, but underwent a process of adaptation to modernity, whose 
practical (political, ethical, religious-ritual and educational) overtones 
were often part of the background of both social engineers, who aimed to 
build an ideologically imbued citizenship in the new modern society, and of 
those intellectuals opposing or resisting such normalising training through 
individualising practices, the effects of which were bound to social, politi-
cal, cultural, or simply individual spheres. These practices could aim at 
perfecting the individual, as well as simply opposing the mainstream men-
tality or bio-powers, sometimes to the point of destroying the individual 
in the attempt. Alternatively, some ventured to elaborate various forms of 
mediation. This essay will refer to two contexts of these practices of the 
self: literature and philosophy, but the scope of the phenomenon was (and 
somehow still is) much vaster.
2 Applying the Concept of Nihilism to Japan
In order to develop our subject, let us begin with the classic definition of 
nihilism by Friedrich Nietzsche, who in a famous fragment of his posthu-
mous Will to Power wrote: «What does Nihilism mean? That the highest 
values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; “why?” finds no answer» 
(Nietzsche 1968, p. 9). Supreme values and transcendent ideals such as 
God, Truth, Good become meaningless, and lose their grip on reality. Ac-
cording to Nietzsche, this devaluation originated with the very creation 
of values by Socrates and Plato. Nihilism is the extreme backlash against 
the establishment of truth on a transcendent plain that has nothing to do 
with this world. Not only does it denounce the mechanisms of classical 
philosophies and religions from Plato to Christianity, from Kantism to He-
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gelism, but, more essentially, it rejects their conceptions of truth and their 
method of knowledge (the ‘vertical’ inquiry of ‘why’).
This reflection by Nietzsche is closely related to the European milieu, 
but how can it be applied to other cultural environments? Does this defi-
nition pose problems in cross-cultural comparison? For example, it has 
often been observed that social values have no transcendent foundation 
in East Asia, and that wisdom develops through ‘horizontal’ (‘how’) more 
than ‘vertical’ (‘why’) questions (cf. Kasulis 2009, pp. 223-224; Cheng 
2000, p. 18). Nevertheless, maintaining that nihilism is based on Western 
ideas and hence must be absent from recent Japanese intellectual history 
sounds grossly orientalist or culturalist, and clashes with many historical 
and social phenomena that have occurred. Currently, Japan is at least as 
nihilistic as many other post-industrial countries. The following passage is 
an example taken from Murakami Haruki’s Dance Dance Dance, in which 
a not specifically Japanese «advanced capitalistic society» is depicted as 
lacking any system of values: 
«Your system» [Makimura] said. […] «Your system may be beside the 
point these days. It went out with handmade vacuum tube amplifiers. 
Instead of wasting all your time trying to build your own, you ought 
to buy a brand-new transistor job. It’s cheaper and it sounds better. 
And if it breaks down they come fix it in no time. When it gets old, 
you can trade it in. Your system may not be so watertight anymore, 
son. It might’ve been worth something once upon a time. But not 
now. Nowadays money talks. It’s whatever money will buy. You can 
buy off the rack and piece it all together. It’s simple. It’s not so bad. 
Get stuck on your system and you’ll be left behind. You can’t cut tight 
turns and you get in everybody’s way». 
«Advanced capitalist society».
«You got it», said Makimura. (Murakami 1995, pp. 193-194)
How can we interpret Japanese nihilism if the theoretical premises that led 
European culture to reject those ‘highest values’ are missing? Is it possible 
to have a similar phenomenon in Japan via an alternative route that does 
not pass through the Nietzschean deconstructive genealogy of the «True 
World Becoming Fable» (Nietzsche 2009, p. 17)? 
Moreover, from cross-cultural and historical perspectives, we could 
ask whether nihilism is a historical phenomenon, subject to historical and 
cultural contingencies, or a kind of universal ‘spiritual category’. If it is 
a historical fact, how does it apply to one specific culture in general, and 
to Japan in particular? If it is not, a kind of contradiction may perhaps be 
at work between the negation of universal truth and the affirmation of 
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universal negation, which may become a kind of universal truth in itself.4
There is at least one example of an important Western philosopher who 
dealt with Japanese nihilism: in the afterword to an essay on nihilism writ-
ten in 1939,5 the German philosopher Karl Löwith advances the thesis that 
Japan had completely misunderstood nihilism which, being eminently a Eu-
ropean phenomenon, was understandable only in the context of European 
intellectual history, and, specifically, within the historical development of 
critical reason. This development found its climax in Hegel, dissolving into 
many rivulets after him, as with Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche. Löwith 
identified nihilism with the destruction of critical reason, upon which hu-
man existence was still grounded. Without this cultural background, Ja-
pan could not understand nihilism as the final result of a critical rational 
process, but only as a chance to demonstrate its own cultural superiority. 
Faced with such an uncritical attitude, Löwith felt it necessary to justify 
European self-criticism, criticising Japanese patriotism and ingenuous 
pragmatism: Japan was only interested in material advancements and ma-
terial technology, refusing any encounter with European civilisation, its 
spirit and history. What Löwith found most disappointing was that, in his 
view, the Japanese were almost completely lacking in any (self-) criticism. 
Although they studied and understood European philosophy, they did not 
draw any consequence for themselves from it. They did not apply criticism, 
but preferred to avoid oppositions, ignoring any logical consequences de-
riving from nihilistic critical assumptions and following social conventions 
and compromises (Löwith 1983).
This position of Löwith’s was based upon his limited and biased reading 
of Japanese culture: since he did not read Japanese, he did not realise that 
many intellectuals (both scholars and philosophers) were actually discuss-
ing (or practising) nihilism very seriously. Still, in his partial defence it 
should be pointed out that their discussions focused on a quite different, 
and hence less recognisable (for a European living in 1930s), approach to 
nihilism, which, more than its theoretical and hermeneutic aspects, con-
sidered its existential praxis in everyday life of the individuals.
In theoretical terms, this difference, which is extremely significant for 
the interpretation of nihilism in Japan, might be linked to the different 
4 This topic could not be exhaustively dealt with here, especially through the means of a 
purely logical argument. Still, this essay intends to consider two opposite answers to such 
a question represented by Karl Löwith, who affirms that the nature of nihilism is historical 
and cultural, albeit ‘universal’ in that it is deeply involved with reason; and by Nishitani 
Keiji, who, on the contrary, indicates its trans-national and even trans-historical character, 
with reference to its existential, more than rational, trait.
5 The essay was entitled: «Der Europäische Nihilismus. Betrachtungen zur geistigen Vor-
geschichte des europäischen Krieges» and was published in Japanese the following year 
in three issues (from September to November) in the review Shisō (Thought), while the 
philosopher was in Japan, fleeing from racial persecution. See Löwith 1983.
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foundations of values, which in the Euro-American countries, as well as 
in the Abrahamitic religions, are theoretical, transcendent and religious 
(God is the guarantee of ethics), but practical and socio-political in Japan 
(ethics is socially defined and is immediately translated into a socially 
determined set of deeds that must be performed, or must be accomplished 
according to rigidly codified procedures). In European intellectual history, 
nihilism has gone hand in hand with the destruction of the philosophical 
(Platonism) and religious (Christianity) transcendent world, epitomised 
by what is known as ‘God’s death’, finally resulting in the disruption of all 
systems of values that ushered in the fully secularised world. Nihilism in 
Japan was collocated in a different configuration: there was no rebellion 
against gods or Buddhas, no high-sounding announcement of God’s death. 
No ‘transcendent value’ was devalued, because social values in Japanese 
culture have less of a theoretical, and more of a practical nature, so that 
ideo-praxis and ortho-praxis are more natural than ideology (and ortho-
doxy). Hence, the demolition of high standards was accomplished in a way 
more consistent with Japanese cultural space. More specifically, in Meiji 
Japan, the questioning of social and political values was often accom-
plished by intellectuals through individual, bodily practices, which found 
their target in the political and religious national beliefs and rites created 
by Meiji ideologues to promote public civic religion (the so-called kokka 
shintō, State Shintō), as well as in the set of ethical and educational civic 
tenets and procedures centred around the Imperial Rescript on Education 
(Kyōiku chokugo 1890), or merely in social common sense and its related 
habitus. Far from juxtaposing reason to God or Truth, nihilism in Japan 
opposed two different kinds of practices or habitus: those defined by the 
individual resisted the nationally or socially established ones. 
In such a context, the debate on individualism and subjectivity was para-
mount. For example, in a study about early post-war Japan, J. Victor Ko-
schmann isolated «an articulate concern on human agency, manifested in a 
debate on active subjectivity» or shutaisei (1996, p. 1). Still, the concern for 
this theme, whose cultural and political overtones affected the development 
of national identity and ideology, can be traced back much earlier: Kōsaka 
Masaaki long ago pointed out that after the Sino-Japanese war (1895) the 
subject had become a fundamental issue in the Japanese intellectual and 
artistic debate (1958, pp. 289 ff.), but, as Sakai Naoki has affirmed, similar 
concerns appeared even among late Edo intellectuals (1997). Starting from 
the late Meiji onwards, the question of individualism had a tremendous 
cultural and political impact on the process of modernisation.6
6 Suffice it here to mention the examples of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement 
( jiyū minken undō) in which subjectivity was said to function as a precondition of modern 
democracy, as well as some writings by the philosopher and politician Katō Hiroyuki (1836-
1916), who, in his Jinken shinsetsu (A New Theory of Human Rights, 1882), wrote: «The theory 
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Still, this was not only an ideological process. It involved the entire 
sphere of practical knowledge, of habitus and assimilated social and na-
tional dispositions that were meticulously defined by officers whose target 
was the creation of the ‘body of the nation’ (or kokutai), which was not 
meant to be a metaphorical expression, but more essentially expressed the 
assimilation within one’s own body of the dispositions defined by the nation 
and, at the same time, the nation as a body (see also Kasulis 2009, p. 228). 
The construction of the individual in modern Japan was radically influenced 
and transformed by the new modern technologies of control and of the self, 
which, through their negotiation, provided the groundwork for a radical 
redefinition and re-adjustment of human being in modernised Japan.
The state functionaries bound their political and religious ideology to 
strategies of indoctrination and normalisation, spread through a capillary 
organisation centred around the Imperial Rescript that created a common 
space of shared practices, pivotal for the construction of the Japanese na-
tion, and that went so far as to determine many everyday practices, which 
ran parallel and reinforced to the ideological level.
Although for opposing reasons and aims, both the champions of social 
homogenisation and the forerunners of individual freedom shared similar 
interests in practices, represented by technologies of control and technolo-
gies of the self, respectively, both frequently inspired by the Buddhist and 
Confucian practical heritage, and aptly transformed to match the needs of 
modern world. Unavoidably, any discussion surrounding the construction 
of the individual in modern Japan (nihilism included) had to confront those 
practices of individualisation or processes of normalisation elaborated 
from pre-modern practices of the self. From this perspective, at least three 
orientations can be identified. The first was a standardising inclination, 
represented by the tennōsei (the Japanese emperor system) ideology sup-
ported by the Imperial Rescript, and by all the ethical, political, anthro-
pological and religious traditions and habits invented in order to uniform 
Japanese social practices, and to create a common, national cultural space.7 
The second orientation consisted of the individualising tendencies that, to 
varying degrees, aimed at passively or actively, consciously or not, oppos-
ing, or at least negotiating, this new-born national culture, keeping their 
distance from the social tide toward integration. These individualising 
tendencies were expressed by means of active opposition – the approach 
adopted by anarchist and communist militants – or by means of passive and 
indirect resistance – like the practice of writing among many shishōsetsu 
of natural rights had no validity. We are not ‘endowed’ with rights; we acquire them. For 
the first time I saw clearly that our rights are those which we as individuals have been able 
to acquire... I saw clearly that our individually acquired rights are inextricably tied to the 
fortunes of our country» (as quoted in Kōsaka 1958, p. 152).
7 On tennōsei ideology, see Gluck 1985. On invented modern Japanese traditions, see Vlastos 1998. 
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(I-novel) authors. Finally, a mediating tendency is identifiable, in the search 
for a point of balance between individualising and standardising inclina-
tions, as with some of the disciplines modernised during the Meiji period, 
for example, martial arts, whose founders were often very interested in the 
educational, ethical and political consequences of their activities for the 
practitioners. Such a mediating tendency in the field of philosophy can be 
observed in the theoretical efforts of the Kyoto School.
3 Nihilism and Practices of Writing in Japanese Modern Literature
The case of the writer and critic Takayama Chogyū (1871-1902) epitomises 
the lacerations between society, the nation and the individual in the period 
preceding the rise of naturalism, but more essentially highlights the extent 
to which these themes were tightly bound together in Meiji Japan. His 
intellectual history was characterised by unexpected, dramatic changes 
revealing a painstaking pursuit of balance between the state and the indi-
vidual. In the first phase (1894-1897), Takayama believed in an equilibrium 
between these two moments, in a kind of romantic activism: the individual 
must be set free to develop him/herself, while at the same time being a 
conscious and conscientious citizen of the state. However, this harmony 
did not last, and Takayama abruptly turned to nationalism in the period 
1897-1900. He began to venerate the Imperial Rescript, and followed its 
ideology, probably as a means to overcome «the sense of crisis which was 
prevalent after the military victory of 1895» (Kōsaka 1958, pp. 306-307). 
Nevertheless, this ideology soon dissatisfied him, and led him to the radi-
cal individualism of the years 1900-1902, in which he praised Nietzsche 
and the ‘aesthetic life’ (biteki seikatsu) as the only manner of satisfying 
instincts, raised to the status of the only life values, higher than morality 
and knowledge (Kōsaka 1958, p. 310).
Takayama’s vitalism anticipated naturalism (shizenshugi), whose im-
portance by far exceeded that of a short-lived literary movement: it repre-
sented the beginnings of modern Japanese individualism and its practices 
(in the form of autobiographical/fictional writing). Naturalism has often 
been linked to nihilism, as in the following statement by the poet Ishikawa 
Takuboku (1886-1912):
From the very outset, man stands alone. The unbearableness of this 
loneliness leads him to build religious fantasies, leads him to have vi-
sions of glory, or wealth, or power. When he senses the loneliness of 
life, this feeling of I stand alone, this is the finish, everything becomes 
useless. Nothingness! Emptiness! [...] The only phrase that naturalism 
has been able to teach man is ‘suit yourself.’ There is neither good 
nor evil, beauty nor ugliness, only ‘bare facts.’ This is what we are left 
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with – bare facts! Suit yourself! What lonely comfortless words! And 
yet there is no alternative. The possession of absolute freedom makes 
‘emptiness’ implicit (as quoted in Kōsaka 1958, pp. 472-473).
As with nihilism, naturalism manifested a stubborn rebellion against the 
social conventions, and epitomised the destruction of social (more than 
religious or theoretical) values. Conversely, it implied the affirmation of 
the individual, considered as the only knowable thing. Still, naturalist faith 
in ‘sincerity’ (makoto), and the subsequent description of ‘pure facts’ (of 
the self) were distant from the nihilistic total lack of faith represented by 
later writers like Masamune Hakuchō (1879-1962). 
However, what typifies Japanese nihilism in literature, especially in the 
years of modernisation, is the tendency to emphasise the practical di-
mension of writing: many writers considered the exercise of writing as 
a technology of the self in every respect, through which to become, and 
explore, one’s self more and more, acquiring independence from society, 
not necessarily in the positive, but sometimes also in the self-destructive 
sense, as an opposition to the powerful modern Japanese bio-powers. From 
such a perspective, for instance, the conception of writing as a practice 
closely linked to the writer’s life can be detected both among the idealists 
of the Shirakabaha (White Birch School), such as Shiga Naoya (1883-1971), 
and the most nihilistic (and later) writers of the so-called Buraiha (Unde-
pendable School), such as Dazai Osamu (1909-1948) or Sakaguchi Ango 
(1906-1955). Writing as a practice of the self was quite common among 
literates: we can find a similar awareness of this theme in romantic writers 
like Kitamura Tōkoku (1868-1894) and Kunikida Doppo (1871-1908), who 
emphasised the importance of the interior world and the role of literature 
in developing oneself, but also among naturalist writers: Shimazaki Tōson 
(1872-1943) used writing not only as a practice to denounce old discrimina-
tions, but also to explore the new geographies of his own self, as a modern 
individual clashing with the social rules. Tayama Katai (1871-1930), who 
wrote his most famous novel Futon (The Quilt, 1907) from his (almost) 
autobiographical perspective, created a form of individual resistance in 
which real life and fiction were inextricably bound together, inaugurating 
a current, which was to have an enormous influence on the subsequent 
I-novel (watakushi shōsetsu) writers (see Bienati 2005, pp. 16 ff.). After 
the Sino-Japanese War (1895), these authors eluded direct confrontation 
with society, having lost any hope of conditioning the state or community, 
and restricted themselves to writing about their own selves in an autobio-
graphical/fictionalised manner. In so doing, they resisted the normalising 
social ideology and rules, and opposed the apparatus of social conventions 
and etiquette that was moulding the individual in modern Japan. This ap-
proach to the individual was so influential in Japanese literature that its 
effects lingered on after the Pacific War, and echoes of this idea can still 
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be found among novelists of today, such as Murakami Haruki, not to speak 
about contemporary film makers such as Sono Shion.
4 Nihilism and the Individual in the Kyoto School
The intellectual inquiry into the modern subject was also dominant among 
the most important philosophical school of modern Japan, i.e. the Kyoto 
School (Kyōto gakuha), which inscribed in its philosophical agenda a radi-
cal re-discussion of (European and modern) subjectivism. These intellectu-
als shared with naturalist writers their search for re-configuring human 
beings as modern individuals, although they seemed to draw more fully 
from pre-modern or trans-modern theoretical and practical sources. Ni-
shitani is a good example of ‘nihilistic practices of the self ’ in philosophy: 
he interpreted nihilism from the perspective of the existential, living self, 
taking inspiration from pre-modern Buddhist practices of self-awareness. 
His was not an isolated case but it epitomises an important orientation for 
many Japanese intellectuals, who not only developed a theoretical concern 
for subjectivity, but whose philosophical, political, social, religious, artistic 
and literary interests very often went hand in hand with various practices 
regarding the newly acquired (and often still blurry) individuality, which 
functioned as a counterpoint to those standardising practices developed 
by the regime ideologues. 
Although the major modern Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō (1870-
1945) devoted most of his intellectual efforts to the question of practical 
philosophy, particularly at the end of his complex theoretical development 
(Cestari 2009), he did not directly touch on the problem of nihilism. Nev-
ertheless, in the Kyoto School the relationship between nihilism and the 
individual is well represented: although they used different approaches and 
diverging perspectives, both Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Nishitani Keiji 
(1900-1992) were conscious of the importance of the link between nihilism 
and the individual, and proposed different analyses of the phenomenon. 
Tanabe aimed to reabsorb the individual in the nation, proving to be 
very close to the regime’s ideology, precisely because he was aware, in 
a more instinctual rather than a clearly conscious manner, of the impor-
tance of nihilism and its relationship with the individual. In fact, although 
his writings make no extensive use of the word ‘nihilism’, his Shu no ronri 
(Logic of Species) somehow came to grips with this theme in the shape 
of a clash between the individual’s ‘will to power’ (kenryoku ishi) and the 
society’s ‘will to life’ (seimei ishi). Tanabe’s ‘solution’ consisted of confer-
ring on the nation-state the role of medium between these opposite and 
ultimately irrational attitudes (Cestari 2008). If, as with Clifford Geertz, 
‘ideology’ provides «maps of problematic social reality» which help clarify 
the individual’s place in the world (Geertz 1973, pp. 193 ff.), such a solu-
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tion was fully ideological, since the liberticidal state of wartime Japan was 
considered as the key to overcoming the aforesaid clash and to helping the 
individual to find his/her place in the world. 
Nishitani was the philosopher of the Kyoto School who most powerfully 
felt the need to link the discussion around nihilism to the question of the 
self and its practices of self-awareness. With him, the question of nihilism 
became the pivotal problem. He provided one of the deepest and most 
original readings of nihilism ever elaborated in Japan. Due to the complex-
ity and the richness of his approach, which would deserve much more than 
these few pages, this paper will only provide a brief outline of some aspects 
of his perspective on Japanese nihilism. This theme is dealt with by Nishi-
tani, especially in the book Nihirizumu (Nihilism), a collection of lessons 
held between 1949 and 1956 (Nishitani 1990), in which he discusses many 
European thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Stirner and Heidegger, reconstruct-
ing post-Hegelian European philosophy. An entire chapter is devoted to 
nihilism in Japan. This essay is extremely important for our paper, even if 
nihility is also further examined in the work Shūkyō to wa nanika (What is 
religion?) (Nishitani 1982). Nishitani’s position is the result of a large set 
of direct or indirect influences: from Buddhism – especially Zen – to West-
ern philosophy – particularly, Heidegger and Nietzsche. On the specific 
question of Japanese nihilism, his interlocutor has the name of Karl Löwith 
(Nishitani 1990, pp. 176 ff.), whose criticism of the Japanese intelligentsia 
has been mentioned before. 
5 Nishitani and Nihilism
Nishitani takes Löwith’s criticism very seriously. He agrees with Löwith’s 
idea that modernisation has weakened Japanese culture and that its past 
has been forgotten, whereas in Europe Christianity and philosophy still 
oppose nihilism (Nishitani 1990, p. 175). Hence, Japanese ‘tradition’ no 
longer exists and has been replaced by a hollow void. This situation is 
further worsened by the fact that the Japanese generally fail to realise 
how strong nihilism is in their country. Therefore, in Nishitani’s opinion, 
Löwith is right in affirming the importance for the Japanese of a critical 
confrontation with European culture. Still, Nishitani does not consider 
nihilism as a purely European matter. Far from confining it to Europe, he 
already sees nihilism spreading as a global phenomenon that now also 
casts its shadow upon Japan (Nishitani 1990, pp. 176-177). 
However, it is in their interpretation of its general sense that the two phi-
losophers are most distant and reveal a strong disagreement concerning 
the correct manner of doing philosophy. If Löwith criticised the Japanese in-
telligentsia for not having understood nihilism from the perspective of criti-
cal thinking, Nishitani reckons that nihilism involves our very self. At the 
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beginning of his work, this thesis sounds provocative: far from interpreting 
nihilism primarily as a question of critical reason, he reads it immediately 
as an existential and practical condition. Such a problem can be properly 
dealt with only if it coincides with the question of the ego lacking sense, 
certainty, meaning and value (Nishitani 1990, pp. 1-2). Nihilism read as the 
problem of the self emerges after the collapse of the rational Subject, on 
which the sense of the world is based. With this destruction, the immediate, 
existential subject – which cannot be simply defined as either substance or 
reason – is finally revealed. Such a change of perspective is quite radical: 
a proper consideration of nihilism needs the subject to identify itself with 
nihilistic void. Hence, nihilism is not simply the loss of moral and religious 
values in general, or the lack of reasons and aims, but is to be enacted as 
the full awareness of the end of the value and the sense of (my)self, in all of 
its practical, bodily and existential meanings. Differently stated, it is a prac-
tical act of presence to oneself. From the Buddhist perspective, it could be 
considered as the deep, bodily awareness of one’s own transitoriness and 
mortality. Underlying the difference between the ways of interpreting nihil-
ism in Nishitani and in European metaphysical tradition does not imply the 
affirmation of any culturalist position (for instance, that, within European 
culture, nihilism was only theoretical and not practical, or that, in Japan, 
nihilism was only practical) but to be aware that Nishitani’s understanding 
of nihilism is not grounded on a process of undermining metaphysical and 
theological assumptions, which has the consequence of translating it into 
practical behaviours and practices. Nishitani’s position attests that nihil-
ism is not oriented towards negating a metaphysical plane, and, only after 
that, the existential dimension, but that it is the direct negation of exist-
ence, a practical, bodily negation that influences the metaphysical, exclu-
sively derivative world. To sum up, Nishitani’s identification with nihilism 
does not begin with a purely intellectual affirmation of a theoretical thesis, 
but with a practical act of self-awareness, like an «experiment within the 
self» that this very self must perform (Nishitani 1990, p. 2), and, which, we 
should add, links the existential self-negation with the Buddhist practice of 
self-awakening. This approach may partially converge with Levinas’ criti-
cism, drawn against the pre-eminence of metaphysics over practice, that 
led the French philosopher to propose ethics as philosophia prima. 
From such a perspective, Löwith’s criticism toward the Japanese intel-
ligentsia accused of not having exerted (self-) criticism is tacitly broadened 
and deepened by Nishitani so as to include the very European critical 
attitude, indirectly charged with being purely objectivistic (or subjectiv-
istic) and not properly recognising the immediately thinking and living 
subject (Nishitani 1990, p. 2). The Japanese philosopher rejects the idea 
that nihilism be reduced to a simple historical phenomenon, or a problem 
«about the essence of being human. […] Inquiry into the philosophy of his-
tory has remained within the standpoint of reflective observation: the one 
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who observes and the one who is observed have been separated. […] Its 
standpoint remains one of observing. The habit of separating essence and 
phenomenon is a residue of just this approach» (Nishitani 1990, p. 5). This 
leads Nishitani to define an inquiry from the perspective of the individual, 
radically historical self, admittedly indebted to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger: 
There must be a way of inquiring into history that is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the way the philosophy of history has been conducted up 
until now. The questioning itself must be historical and the inquirer uni-
fied within history. What is more, the inquiry must be conducted ‘with 
passion’ and existentially, so that the relationship between essence and 
phenomenon in history and humanity is realized existentially and thor-
oughly within historical existence. In other words, the great historical 
problems need to become the problems of the self. (Nishitani 1990, p. 5) 
For the purpose of our discussion, we could say that this approach brings 
the spiritual subtlety of Buddhist meditative practices, and its roots in bod-
ily existence of the self into the modern discussion on the technologies of 
the self. Replacing theoretical with practical questions, Nishitani aims to 
embrace Löwith’s position, while at the same time further raising the bar: 
those who blame the lack of criticism among Japanese intellectuals would 
still miss the essential point, common to both Europe and Japan: the lack 
of radical self-criticism as individuals. In Nishitani’s words, far from be-
ing a matter of reason, nihilism deals with our very bodily existence, our 
self-awareness as a practical act of being present to ourselves, and our 
condition. Such a radical doubt destroys all certainties and, becoming our 
self, discloses us as no-selves, thus awakening to ‘the true suchness’ of 
things. As J. Heisig points out, this is «not a simple blanking of the mind, 
but a disciplined emptying of mind», that goes «far beyond the bounds 
of a private mental exercise», up «to metaphysical insight into reality as 
such» (2001, p. 221). Hence, we should note, the roots are sunk in practice, 
not in metaphysics. 
No doubt this reading is peculiar to Nishitani: never has nihilism been so 
clearly related to the theme of immediate, practicing self, at least among 
European philosophers. Such a position has deep relations with the Japa-
nese modern cultural milieu, whereas it can be included in the general 
trend of those modern Japanese thinkers who approached nihilism from 
the perspective of the individual and his/her status in the modern world. 
Nishitani, thanks to his insight into the individual through his Zen Buddhist 
pre-comprehensions, plays an important role in developing alternative pat-
terns of modern subjectivity, which he centres on the importance of the 
religious-practical act of self-awareness. Moreover, he seems to shift the 
paradigms of philosophical perspective, away from the classical, humanis-
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tic tradition towards a bodily and practical approach to human being. This 
move is accomplished through openly bio-political perspective, endowed 
with clearly religious overtones. 
If we follow Roberto Esposito’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Letter 
on Humanism as expression of a deep awareness of the biological nature 
of human being which forces us to confront with what the German phi-
losopher variously defined as ‘life’, ‘world’ or ‘existence’ and could not be 
sufficiently represented in humanism and its classical political philosophy 
(2004, p. 164), we can probably say the same also about Nishitani. There 
are however at least two main differences. On one hand, whereas Heideg-
ger still considered «being in the world» as more important than life (Espo-
sito 2004, pp. 166-167), Nishitani on the contrary seems to give priority to 
the «pre-philosophical», which nonetheless moves toward philosophy. Far 
from limiting his approach to the existential and philosophical perspective, 
the relationship between life and nihilism is repeatedly emphasized in his 
writings (Nishitani 1986, p. 24). On the other, thanks to the previous differ-
ence, his ultimately religious consciousness of nihilism, unlike Heidegger, 
acquires a clearly bio-political weight. In Nishitani’s perspective, Bud-
dhism and nihilism merge in the individual’s life, becoming the sources of 
the practice of self-awareness. In the Japanese philosopher, truth is clearly 
bound to biological and emotional life of the individuals. Nihilism does not 
fuel rebellion against society, but inspires a continuous practice of existen-
tial and bodily doubt, which accompanies the entire life of an individual. 
As a provisional conclusion, we could ask whether the experience of 
nihilism in modern Japan may be helpful to understand our world today. 
Certainly, the stress on practices is of outmost importance, since it helps 
to reinvent philosophy away from contemplation back to its ancient, prac-
tical vocation. Still, the main problem is what kind of practices can be or 
should be encouraged in our world. If we look back to Foucault definitions 
of technologies of control and technologies of the self, the first ones could 
hardly be desirable, although they have been massively used in modern 
countries. Still, in late modern world, the technologies of the self seem to 
be particularly exposed to the risk of nihilism and self-destruction, running 
the risk of engendering further deregulation, in a world increasingly liquid: 
if not wisely balanced, they may prove to intensify the destructive power 
of the permanent warfare state that characterizes the «liquid societies» of 
late modernity (see Cestari 2014. The idea of ‘liquid society’ is originally by 
Zygmunt Bauman). Today, a good balance between inner and outer urges is 
extremely hard to find. Nishitani’s path, notwithstanding its strongly reli-
gious nature, which someone may find difficult to share, especially from a 
political perspective, is intended to avoid the risks of the extremes of bend-
ing the knee to the state, as Tanabe did, as well as of destroying oneself 
in the attempt to rebel to the state or society, as with many shishōsetsu 
writers. This search for mediation should be carefully considered. 
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